Deposition--Scope of Inquiry--Names of Witnesses by Penner, Ronald
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 1
1952
Deposition--Scope of Inquiry--Names of Witnesses
Ronald Penner
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Ronald Penner, Deposition--Scope of Inquiry--Names of Witnesses, 4 W. Res. L. Rev. 86 (1952)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol4/iss1/14
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The only prior Ohio law on the point is the case of Snedaker v. King,
in which an injunction restraining a woman from alienating the affections
of the plaintiff's husband was dissolved by the Ohio Supreme Court on the
grounds that the injunction was an unfair restriction of the personal free-
dom of the defendant, would be too difficult to enforce, and would aggra-
vate the estrangement between husband and wife.
The court in the principal case distinguishes it from Snedaker v. King on
these grounds: first, the injunctions in this case are not permanent but for
only six weeks, and hence, the enforcement problem is not so grave as in
the Snedaker case; second, in this case the injunctions are sought in connec-
tion with an action for alimony, and the state is interested in promoting a
reconciliation between husband and wife;9 to aid in the desired reconcilia-
tion, the Ohio Legislature has enacted the mandatory six-week waiting
period between the issuance of summons and the hearing of the case,'" and
by enjoining the defendants pendente lite the court is giving effect to the
statutory policy.
No other case has been found in which an injunction was granted re-
straining a spouse from associating with a third person. In the dissenting
opinion of Judge Marshall in Snedaker v. King, he implies that had the in-
junction been sought against the husband, rather than the third party, it
should have been denied.'1 In the principal case, however, the granting of
the temporary injunctions against both defendants during the pendency of
the alimony action seems justified in view of the important public policy
of encouraging a reconciliation between the husband and wife and the
statutory waiting period enacted to implement that 'policy.
LARRY A. BROCK
DEPOSITION - SCOPE OF INQUIRY - NAMES OF WITNESSES
The defendant in a personal injury suit was taking the plaintiff's deposi-
tion. The plaintiff testified that she was accompanied by her husband and
three other couples when the injuries were incurred, but when asked the
names and addresses of these other couples, she refused to answer. The
notary before whom the deposition was taken then filed a request that the
court instruct the plaintiff to answer the question. Held: The plaintiff must
reveal the names and addresses of these witnesses.' The court reasoned
App. 1923); Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 413, 50 S.W 933 (1899). And
see Hall v. Smith, 80 Misc. 85, 87, 140 N.Y. Supp. 796, 798 (1913).
111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924)
'See K zER, MARRIAGE AND DivoRca 243 (3rd ed. 1946).
" See note 1, supra.
"See 111 Ohio St. 225, 244, 145 N.E. 15, 21 (1924); Knighton v. Knighton, 252
Ala. 520, 524, 41 So.2d 172, 175 (1949).
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that the question was relevant as seeking information not relating exclu-
sively to the plaintiffs case and not privileged.
The bill of discovery, which originated in courts of chancery, permitted
discovery of an opponent's testimony and was by statutes made a part of
the practice in common law courts.2 The courts, in interpreting these
statutes, have generally held that their purpose is merely to extend to all
courts a practice that formerly existed in equity alone, and that, conse-
quently, the discovery is limited to the obtaining of the opponenes own
testimony and can not be used to ascertain his other evidence8  As a
corollary to this limitation, most courts will not compel a party to disclose
the names of Is witnesses upon statutory discovery proceedings.4
In the leading Ohio case of Ex parte Schoepf,5 the court stated that
where the only purpose of an inquiry is to compel a party to disclose before
trial the names of his possible witnesses, such inquiry is "clearly incom-
petent". The court in the principal case, however, contends that this rule
has been changed by subsequent Ohio decisions, so that the names of wit-
nesses can be obtained from an adverse party on deposition if such names
were known to that party at the time the facts constituting the cause of
action occurred. To support this contention the court relies upon In re
Hyde7 and In re Keough.8 In those cases the plaintiffs attempted to elicit
by subpoena general records of a transit company containing the names
and addresses of the operators of company vehicles involved in traffic acci-
dents. In each case the court held that such information, contained in
aurman v. Central Park Plaza Corp., 102 N.E.2d 622 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl. 1951).
26 WIGMOEB, EVIDENCE § 1856a (3rd ed. 1940). See, e.g., OHIo GENERAL CODE
H8 11348-11350, 11497, 11555.
3 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1856b (3rd ed. 1940); Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1,
77 N.E. 276 (1906). In equity the bill of discovery was strictly limited to the op-
ponent's own testimony, and he was not required to divulge in advance his evidence
in support of his testimony, or to disclose the names of his witnesses. 6 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1856 (3rd ed. 1940).
'Kinney v. Rice, 238 Fed. 444 (D.C.Cir. 1916); Ex parte Nolen, 223 ALa. 213, 135
So. 337 (1931); Montgomery L & T. v. Harris, 197 Ala. 358, 72 So. 619 (1916);
Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. Super. C. 456, 178 Ad. 640 (1935);
State ex rel. Evans v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 123, 149 S.W 473 (1912); Watkins v.
Cope, 84 N. J.L. 143, 86 Ad. 545 (1913); Ex Parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77
N.E. 276 (1906); Armstrong v. Portland Ry. Co., 52 Ore. 437, 97 Pac. 715
(1908) Yorkshire Worsted Mills v. National Transit Co., 325 Pa. 427, 190 Ad.
897 (1937); cf. Penniam v. Jones, 59 N.H. 119 (1&79); contra: FED. R. CIV. P.
26b; MAss. LAws c. 231, Sec. 63; McNeil v. Middlesex & B. St. R. Co., 233 Mass.
254, 123 N.E. 676 (1919); SoUTH DAKOTA CODE of 1939 Sec. 36.0505.
'74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906).
' It is noteworthy that the court in the Schoepf case did not ate any authority to sus-
tain its holding, nor did the court rely on the historical equity practice as did the
cases ated in note 4, supra.
7149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948).
'151 Ohio St 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1949).
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